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Abstract—Many cognitive systems deploy multiple, closed, individually
consistent models which can represent interpretations of the present
state of the world, moments in the past, possible futures or alternate
versions of reality. While they appear under different names, these
structures can be grouped under the general term of worlds. The Xapagy
architecture is a story-oriented cognitive system which relies exclusively
on the autobiographical memory implemented as a raw collection of
events organized into world-type structures called scenes. The system
performs reasoning by shadowing current events with events from the
autobiography. The shadows are then extrapolated into headless shadows
corresponding to predictions, hidden events or inferred relations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many cognitive systems deploy multiple, individually consistent,
usually closed models which can represent an interpretation of the
present state of the world, a moment in the past, a possible future or
an alternate version of reality. These models are often called worlds
or contexts, although many alternative names exist. For instance,
Soar [7], [8] dynamically creates structures called substates whenever
it encounters an impasse in reasoning, and needs new knowledge
added to the reasoning pool. In Cyc [9] subtheories are used to
represent alternate versions of reality, for instance, the description
of the state of the world in a certain moment in the past (for
instance, we can have a microtheory in which Nelson Mandela is
still a prisoner). The Polyscheme architecture [4] integrates different
representations and reasoning algorithms by allowing them to operate
over simulated worlds. In [3], the authors show that worlds-based
reasoning by simulation can emulate the Davis-Putnam-Logemann-
Loveland algorithm and the Gibbs sampling method of probabilistic
inference.
The Xapagy cognitive architecture is a recently developed cognitive
system, which aspires to mimic the cognitive activities humans use
in thinking about stories – in effect subscribing to the strong-story
hypothesis [14]. The system is based on several unusual design
decisions. The autobiographical memory is the only memory model1.
The content of the autobiographical memory is never extracted into
general purpose rules: there is no learning, only a recording of
the experiences. While most major cognitive systems implement
an episodic/autobiographical memory (see [10] for Soar, and [11]
for ICARUS), the importance of the autobiographical memory for
Xapagy is more critical. The system has no procedural or skill
memory, no rule or production memory, and no concept hierarchy.
The content of the working memory (the focus) can be moved into the
long term (autobiographical) memory, but not the other way around.
1When referring to the Xapagy system, we prefer to use the term “auto-
biographical memory” rather than “episodic memory”. The latter is strongly
associated with the work of Tulving [12]. However, in Tulving’s view episodic
memory is a “recently evolved, late-developing [. . . ] past-oriented memory
system” whose “operations require, but go beyond, the semantic memory
system” [13]. In contrast, the autobiographical memory in Xapagy is not the
culmination, but the foundation of all other memory-like behaviors.
The agent cannot reload a previous experience, nor parts of it. The
autobiographical memory influences the behavior of the agent only
through the shadowing mechanism.
Xapagy shares with many other cognitive architectures (such as
ACT-R [2], [1]) the assumption that acting, witnessing, story follow-
ing, recall and confabulation are implemented by a common serial
mechanism. Together with the other design decisions, this triggers
several unexpected implications. The first is the undifferentiated
representation of direct and indirect experiences. The stories exiting
from the story bottleneck are recorded together in the autobiographi-
cal memory, with no fundamental distinguishing feature. The second
implication is the unremarkable self. The Xapagy agent maintains
an internal representation of its cognition (the real-time self), in
the form of an instance labeled "Me". However, this instance is not
fundamentally different from the instances representing other entities.
Together with the inability to recall instances from the memory, this
yields another implication, the fragmentation of the self. As the entity
of the self can not be retrieved from memory, only recreated, an
agent remembering its own stories will have simultaneously several
representations of itself, only one of them marked as its real time
self. Thus, every recall of a story creates a new story.
Due these unusual design decisions, the Xapagy architecture pro-
vides a more fragmented view of reality than other architectures.
Situations which in colloquial language appear as an entity going
through a series of changes, in Xapagy is represented through several
distinct instances, possibly connected by binary relations. The shad-
owing mechanism aligns the stories recorded in the autobiographic
memory with the current focus. The main reasoning model of the
Xapagy system operates by extrapolating the shadows of the focus
into headless shadows. These can be seen as predictions (although
they can also represent the hidden events, inferred relations or
summarizations of the ongoing story). In this sense, Xapagy can be
seen to subscribe to the view of the memory-prediction framework
of intelligence of Hawkins [5]. However, in contrast to the Hawkins
model, where the memory stores invariant forms, which denote
unique entities, the Xapagy memory only stores raw autobiographical
data, distributed over a large number of fragmented instances.
The objective of this paper is to describe the shadowing / headless
shadow reasoning mechanism, with a special focus on how the
autobiographical representation and the scene model is a critical
ingredient for this reasoning method.
II. INSTANCES, VIS, FOCUS AND SHADOWS
The definition of an instance in Xapagy is somewhat different from
the way this term is used in other intelligent systems. Instead of
representing an entity of the real world, it represents an entity of the
story, over a time span limited by the additivity of the attributes.
Once an instance acquired an attribute, the attribute remains attached
to the instance forever. Things we colloquially call a single entity
are represented in Xapagy by several instances. Let us, for instance,
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2consider Little Red Riding Hood (LRRH). There are several versions
of the story, ranging from Charles Perrault’s (with no happy ending)
and the widely known Brothers Grim version, to the countless
adaptations and parodies in modern media, including the 2011 movie
starring Amanda Seyfried. In Xapagy, these are all different instances,
which share the attribute ["LRRH"]. The Xapagy system, however,
moves a step beyond this. Not only LRRH from the Brothers Grim
story and LRRH from the Hollywood movie are represented by
different instances, but LRRH the live girl and LRRH the food item
in the wolf’s belly are also two different instances, as the change can
not be represented as an addition of attributes. These instances, can
be connected through various relations of identity: the living and the
dead wolf are connected through bodily (somatic) identity, while the
real LRRH and the one from the mother’s orders is connected by a
fictional-future identity relation.
Events, actions or relations between instances are represented in
Xapagy by a verb instance (VI). There are five structural types of
VIs: subject-verb-object, subject-verb, subject-isa-adjective, action-
is-adverb and subject-scene-quote. The source of VIs can be outside
the agent, in the form of statements written in the Xapi language,
which map to one or several VIs. VIs, however, can be also created
internally by the processes of summarization, inference of missing
actions or relations, recall or confabulation.
The position occupied by worlds or contexts in other cognitive
systems, in Xapagy are taken by scenes. Every instance is assigned
to a scene at the moment it is created, and the scene of the instance is
not changeable. For most VIs, all the components of the VI are part
of the same scene. There are, however, several exceptions. Identity
relations might connect instances in different scenes. For quote-type
VIs, the quote statement can take place in different scene from the
inquit.
Let us consider an example, where at the end of the story, LRRH,
now a grown woman, expresses the fact that she was afraid in
Grandma’s house facing the wolf. There are two scenes "StoryEnd"
and "GrandmasHouse". There are also two instances of LRRH in
these scenes, which are connected through an identity relation, but
otherwise share very little in common. The scenes are connected
through a scene-succession relation. The Xapi statement will be:
1 "LRRH" / says in scene "GrandmasHouse" //
2 I / is-a / afraid.
Notice how the word “I” in the quote does not refer to the instance
of the speaker: it refers to the instance which is identity-connected
to the speaker in the scene of the quote.
The Xapagy equivalent of a working memory is the focus, a
weighted set of recent instances and VIs. In absence of any events,
the weights are gradually decreasing. Instances are reinforced when
they participate in new VIs. Action VIs are “pushed out” from the
focus by their successors, while relation VIs stay in the focus as long
as their associated instances are in the focus. While in the focus,
instances and VIs can acquire new attributes and relations, and they
gradually increase their salience in the autobiographic memory. After
an instance or VI leaves the focus, it can never return.
The instances and VIs from the autobiographical memory affect
the current state of the agent by shadowing the focus. Each instance
and VI in the focus is the head of a an associated instance or VI set
called the body of the shadow.
The challenge, of course, is how to populate and maintain the
shadows such that they reflect the previous experience of the agent
with respect to the ongoing story. The system maintains its internal
structures using the interaction between a number of activities which
are of an O(|AM |) or lower complexity, where |AM | is the size of
the autobiographic memory. There are two kinds of activities: spike
activities (SA) and diffusion activities (DA). SAs are instantaneous
operations, executed one at a time. DAs represent gradual changes in
the weighted sets; the output depends on the amount of time the
diffusion was running. Multiple DAs run in parallel, reciprocally
influencing each other.
In the following we briefly enumerate the SAs and DAs which
maintain the shadows. The + or - prefix indicates whether the
activities reinforce or weaken the shadow components. The shadow
maintenance activities are self-regulating, encompassing elements of
negative feedback as well as resource limitation.
(S+) The addition of an unexpected instance or VI creates a corre-
sponding empty shadow.
(S+) The addition of an expected instance or VI creates a new shadow
from the headless shadow which predicted it.
(D-) In the absence of other factors, all the shadows decay in time.
The resources released in this DA are added to the resources of
the environment.
(D+) Matching the head: instances from memory which match the
shadow head will be strengthened in the shadow body. The
resources for this DA come from the environment.
(D+/-) Consistency: the participation of the VI in a shadow and the
participation of its parts in the shadows of the corresponding
parts of the shadow head are pulled towards a common value in
a resource-neutral way.
(D+/-) Instance identity sharpening: if an in-memory instance par-
ticipates in multiple shadows, the strong participations will
be gradually reinforced, while the weak participations will be
further weakened. The operation is resource neutral for a given
memory instance.
(D+/-) Non-identity: if a shadow contains instances which are con-
nected through the non-identity relation2, the instance with the
stronger participation is reinforced while the instance with the
weaker participation is weakened. The operation is resource
neutral for a given non-identity pair.
(D+) Identity relation: adds to the shadows instances connected
through the identity relation to the shadow head and reinforces
those instances.
III. HEADLESS SHADOWS
Headless shadows (HLSs) are collections of related and aligned
in-memory VIs which are not paired with any current in-focus VI.
The creation and maintenance of HLSs involves three distinct enti-
ties: shadow VI relatives (SVRs), shadow VI relative interpretations
(SVRIs) and the HLSs themselves. Although for the sake of clarity
we describe the creation of these entities in sequential order, in
the Xapagy agent these components are maintained by several DAs
operating in parallel.
A. Shadow VI relatives
A shadow VI relative (SVR) is a structure built around a VI
which is “related” to a VI which is currently in the shadow. Let
us consider Figure 1. In the focus we have the VI FocusVI of type
S-V-O, which has its subjects and objects the instances FocusI1
and FocusI2 respectively. These elements have their own respective
shadows. Let us consider the VI viRoot from the shadow of
FocusVI. This is also of type S-V-O, and has its subject and
object viRootSubject and viRootObject, which are part of the
2The non-identity relation is explicitly created for distinct instances in the
same story line. For example, Achilles is non-identical to the instance of
Hector with which it is currently fighting. However, Achilles is not non-
identical with Lancelot.
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Fig. 1. The composition of an SVR. VIs are represented as diamonds,
instances as squares. Shadows are the same type as the instance they are
shadowing.
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Fig. 2. Shadow VI relative interpretations.
shadows of FocusI1 and FocusI2 respectively3. Let us now consider
the VI viSource which is related to viRoot by being connected
through a succession relation. The SVR is the quadruplet formed by
the FocusVI, viRoot, viSource and the relation type connecting
viRoot to viSource. The latter one is called the type of the
SVR, and it can take nine possible values, all but one arranged
in opposing pairs: IN_SHADOW, PREDECESSOR ←→ SUCCESSOR,
SUMMARY ←→ ELABORATION, ANSWER ←→ QUESTION, CONTEXT
←→ CONTEXT_IMPLICATION.
Intuitively, the viSource in the SVR represents a VI which was
present when situations similar to the one in the current focus had
been encountered. An SVR by itself does not present a prediction with
regards to the current focus, because the viSource is expressed in
terms of in-memory instances, not in-focus instances. In order to find
out what kind of prediction does an SVR imply, we must interpret
it.
B. Shadow VI relative interpretations
Let us take a look at Figure 2 which elaborates on Figure 1. If
viSource will be interpreted as a continuation, it will predict the VI
viPredicted which will also have the format S-V-O. We can make
the assumption that the verb in viPredicted will be the same as
in viSource. Finding the subject and the object of viPredicted is
more complicated: the parts of viSource are past instances from
the memory which can not be brought back, while the parts of
viPredicted must be instances in the focus.
With regards to the subject, we notice that the subject of viSource
is the same as the object of viRoot, which in turn, had been obtained
as the shadow of FocusI2. We can infer from here than the subject
of viPredicted will be FocusI2.
The object, however, is more complicated, as it can not be
unequivocally inferred from the viRoot. Our technique to find
3These instances can be part of multiple shadows.
an interpretation of viSourceObject will be based on “reverse
shadowing”: we look up the shadows in which viSourceObject is
present, and we consider their heads as candidates with the relative
strength of viSourceObject in their respective shadows.
In our case, viSourceObject is present in the shadows of
InstanceE1 and InstanceE2, these two representing possible inter-
pretations of viSourceObject. In addition, there is also a possibility
of interpreting viSourceObject as an instance which does not yet
exist in the focus, InstanceNew.
Putting these considerations together, and denoting the verb of
viSource with act, we have three possible predictions associate
with viPredicted, which can be described in Xapi as follows:
1 The FocusI2 / act / the InstanceE1.
2 The FocusI2 / act / the InstanceE2.
3 The FocusI2 / act / an InstanceNew.
where InstanceNew is a newly created instance which will be
initialized with some of the attributes of viSourceObject. These
verb instance templates, together with the SVR which are the source
of them constitute the SVRIs, weighted by the likelihood of the
individual interpretations.
C. Headless shadows
Headless shadows (HLSs) aggregate the support of different types
of SVRIs. An HLS is composed of a template for a possibly
instantiatable VI and a collection of compatible SVRIs. An SVRI is
compatible with a template if the corresponding instance parts are the
same and the corresponding concept and verb overlays are “close”.
The example used to introduce SVRs and SVRIs was based on a
SUCCESSION relation, thus we kept referring to them as “predictions”.
The nine different types of SVRIs provide support for or against
specific types of HLSs. Let us consider a case where we see the
HLS as a prediction of events to happen next. An SVRI of type
SUCCESSOR provides evidence that similar events succeeded events
in the shadows – this is a supporting evidence. An SVRI of type
PREDECESSOR provides evidence that similar events preceded events
in the shadow – which means that they are not successors – this can
be interpreted as a negative evidence. An SVRI of type IN_SHADOW
means that the given prediction can be mapped back to events which
already happened, thus they are not a proper prediction – again, a
negative evidence. An SVRI of type CONTEXT_IMPLICATION shows
that similar things have happened in similar contexts – a positive
evidence. An SVRI of type ELABORATION means that similar things
happened when elaborating stories which can be summarized with
the same VIs.
The support of the HLS integrates these evidences into a single
number. When an HLS is used to instantiate a new VI, the VI will
be created based on the template, while the new shadow will be
formed by the viSource-s associated with the SVRIs with a positive
contribution. After the initial creation of the shadow, this will evolve
under the control of the shadow maintenance DAs.
When the HLS is used for a different purpose, the evidences are
combined in a different way. For instance, for the inference of a
missing action, a PREDECESSOR SVRI is a positive evidence: it can
show that we are witnessing the effect of an action which we have
not seen.
IV. UNDERSTANDING A CHILDREN’S STORY
The objective of the Xapagy system is to mimic the human
behavior with respect to stories. In this section, we will use the
example of a children’s fairytale, Little Red Riding Hood, to illustrate
how an agent can be prepared for the understanding of the story,
and what types of behaviors we can expect the agent to mimic.
4The reminder of this section summarizes our ongoing work in this
direction.
Translating LRRH into Xapi. The first step is to convert the story
into a format understandable to the Xapagy system. The English
original we used was a hand-written, 500 words long version, which
includes a framing device: the narration starts by a little girl Cindy
going to bed, and her father is reading her the story of LRRH from
the Brothers Grimm fairy tale book.
The English text had been manually translated to Xapi. The Xapi
version is 150 statements long, which, when parsed, is translated into
179 verb instances. Figure 3 illustrates the main set of scenes and
instances created through this parsing. The full story is represented
through a progression of 12 scenes. Some of these are connected
through succession relationships, but we also have separate scenes for
the frame, for the dialogs, as well as the representation of LRRH’s
plans within the dialog. The little girl is represented by 9 distinct
instances (including the fictional one in Mom’s orders and the planned
one when the girl discloses her plans to the wolf). The wolf is
represented by 7 instances (including the instance where the wolf
impersonates Grandma as well as the alive but sleeping wolf, and
the dead wolf shot by the hunter). Translating the story from English
to Xapi took about 4 hours of translation work. This number needs to
be put in perspective by the fact that this is the first longer story we
have translated to Xapi. Xapi is inherently more verbose compared to
English, because, in most cases, it requires the explicit specification
of the scenes, instances and identity relations.
Extending the concept database and dictionary. The operation of
the Xapagy agent requires a domain library, consisting of a concept
and verb database, and a dictionary which maps words to overlays
of concepts or verbs. All Xapagy agents share a core knowledge
base (Xapagy Core Domain Library - XCDL) which defines basic
concepts such as attributes, scenes, groups, and spatial relations, as
well as core verbs such as attribute assignment, instance change and
movement in space. About two dozen verbs in XCDL are special
purpose metaverbs which have side effects when activated, and thus
carry procedural information.
The information contained in the Xapagy domain library is very
light compared to the domain databases of comparable systems. With
the exception of the metaverbs, the definition of the concepts and
verbs contain information only about their overlap and impact with
other concepts or verbs. The semantics of the concepts and verbs is
carried not by the domain library, but by the autobiography.
To translate LRRH into Xapi, we have reused some of the previ-
ously defined domain libraries for topics such as animals, humans,
and family relations. To translate the LRRH story into Xapi, we also
had to define a number of new concepts, such as “basket”, “hood”,
“wine” and “swallow”.
Collecting a synthetic autobiography. Having a translation of a
story in Xapi and a corresponding domain library is sufficient for the
agent to parse and represent the story. However, the reasoning ability
of the Xapagy agent is based on the shadows and headless shadows
populated from the autobiography. If there is no relevant information
in the autobiography to populate the shadows, no reasoning can
take place. There is no shortcut: in Xapagy, we can not replace
the autobiography with general purpose rules / scripts / productions,
as the shadows only carry particular instances. We can, of course,
populate the autobiography with examples which illustrate external
rules.
To achieve the understanding of a story like LRRH, we need to
provide the agent with a synthetic autobiography equivalent to that
of a four year old child. While it appears that storing rules and
procedures is more efficient than storing a complete autobiography,
we find that the size of the human experience is not particularly large
compared to the current size of computer storage. If the four old child
is witnessing 1 event / second for 16 hours / day (in our opinion, a
high estimate), the memory will contain roughly 84 million events,
many of them repetitive. This amount of data is computationally
quite manageable, as the autobiographic memory, as an unprocessed
recording of events, does not suffer from combinatorial explosion. A
similar conclusion is reached in [6].
We can, of course, restrict the autobiography to stories relevant to
the story at hand. A good rule of thumb is that all the concepts used
in the story, as well as their overlap pairs should have supporting
stories.
The upshot is that we do not need to define concepts, only stories in
which they appear. Furthermore, the architecture degrades gracefully:
the agent can still perform predictions even if some of the concepts
introduced do not have associated stories. For instance, we do not
need to define what a hunter is: we only need stories in which hunters
appear - their actions in those stories will shadow the actions of the
hunter in the current story. If the agent had never heard about a
hunter, it will still be able to parse the story, but it will not be able
to predict that the hunter is carrying a gun, that it will shoot the wolf
and so on.
As an illustration of the nature of the stories we are considering
useful for the autobiography for understanding LRRH, here is a
collection of stories which we are currently using as a synthetic
autobiography for reasoning about LRRH:
• Stories where carnivorous animals feed on other animals (lion
feeding on a deer, shark feeding on small fish, a Fantastic Mr.
Fox eating a chicken).
• Stories of eating: first person experience that eating something
disappears.
• Stories of conversation: humans take turns saying something.
• Stories of question answering: a question is followed by an
answer.
• Stories of following instructions: the actions from a scene are
reproduced by the identity linked objects in the other scene.
• Stories involving interaction between a grandmother and her
granddaughter.
Reasoning about the story. The type of reasoning provided by
Xapagy is different from reasoning performed by logic based systems.
We can not ask the system whether a certain knowledge-base is log-
ically consistent: Xapagy can accept and store logically inconsistent
stories.
Instead, the type of questions a Xapagy agent can answer are along
the lines of the informal reasoning people do about stories. Given that
we are at a certain point of the story, what do you think it can happen
next? What continuations would surprise you? What kind of other
events must have happened, which were not explicitly mentioned in
the story? If you put itself in place of one of the characters, what
would you do next? A Xapagy agent can answer these questions
based on the instances and verb instances appearing in the shadows
and the different types of headless shadows and their support.
Let us consider an example. The agent is reading the story of
LRRH and the last two Xapi statements read were:
1 The wolf / says in scene "Conversation"//
2 eyes -- of -- I / sees good / the girl.
3 The girl / asks in scene "Conversation"//
4 mouth -- of -- "Grandma" / wh is-a / big?
What type of predictions will the shadowing architecture make?
Examining the continuation-type headless shadows available at this
point, we find that the agent predicts two main class of actions. The
first class of actions predict the continuation of the conversation:
1 Wolf / says in "conversation" / [x]
These kind of HLSs are supported by previously seen conver-
5[scene "Forest"][scene "Bedroom"]
[scene "Germany"]
[wolf big]
["Cindy" young 
woman]
[scene "Fairytale"] [scene "MomsHouse"]
[scene "MomsOrders"] [scene "ForestConversation"]
[scene "LRRHPlan"]
[scene 
"GrandmasHouse1"] [scene "GrandmasHouse2"]
[scene "Conversation"]
[scene 
"GrandmasHouse3"]
[scene-succession]
[man adult]
["Brothers 
Grim"]
["LRRH" 
young woman]
[hood red] ["LRRH" 
young woman]
[adult woman]
["LRRH" 
young woman]
["Grandma" 
old woman]
["LRRH" 
young woman]
["LRRH" 
young woman]
["Grandma" 
old woman]
["LRRH" 
young woman]
[wolf big]
["Grandma" 
old woman]
[wolf big]
["LRRH" 
young woman]
["LRRH" 
young woman]
["Grandma" 
old woman]
[wolf big]
[wolf dead]
[hunter man]
["Grandma" 
old woman]
["LRRH" 
young woman]
[scene- 
succession]
[scene- 
succession]
[scene- 
fictional- 
future]
[scene- 
succession]
[scene- 
succession]
[scene- 
view]
[scene- view]
[scene- 
fictional- 
future]
Fig. 3. The scene and identity structure of the story of Little Red Riding Hood written in the Xapi pidgin and parsed into Xapagy. We ignored some of
the entities present in the story (hood, basket and so on), instead focused on the main characters.
sations, where an asking statement had been frequently followed
by the other party saying something. It is harder to predict the
what the quote [x] will be. However, we can make a predic-
tion, that there will be an ANSWER relationship between [x] and
mouth -- of -- "Grandma"/ wh is-a / big?.
Another class of HLSs make the prediction:
1 The wolf / eats / the girl.
The support for these predictions comes from the scenes involving
a carnivorous animal eating another animal. The wolf is shadowed
by the tiger, the alligator and “The Fantastic Mr. Fox”, while the girl
is shadowed by the corresponding deer, fish and chicken. Note how
the instance of the girl can be shadowed by instances with whom she
shares very little.
Let us now consider the way in which the agent uses the pool of
predictive HLSs during passive following of a story (for instance,
reading, listening or witnessing). Whenever a new action happens,
it will be matched against the actions predicted by the headless
shadows. If a suitable HLS is found, it will become the shadow of
the new VI. The support of the HLS is the level at which the action
was “expected”. The Xapagy architecture defines “surprise” as the
absolute volume of changes in the shadows and HLSs introduced by
a new VI. There are examples of unexpected actions which are not
surprises:
1 The wolf / sneezes.
The agent might have examples of sneezing in its autobiography,
however, nothing in the the story had justified the prediction of sneez-
ing. However, once this event actually happens, the corresponding
shadow will be established and a prediction will be made for:
1 "LRRH" / utters / text "Bless you".
The sneezing was unexpected, there was no HLS predicting it.
However, it is not a major surprise, as the change in the shadows
and HLSs it introduces is minimal and localized. The wolf eating or
swallowing LRRH on the other hand, is not unexpected: it is predicted
from the stories involving carnivore animals (or from the reproduction
of the story, if the agent had previously read it). However, the
action, through its impacts, removes LRRH from the focus, and
thus the events which involve her future participation will become
unsupported. This leads to a major reorganization of the shadows and
HLSs. With this definition, the wolf eating LRRH is not unexpected,
but it is a surprise.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We presented the reasoning technique of the Xapagy architecture.
In certain ways the reasoning model is anchored in well known
techniques deployed in cognitive systems: it implements the strong
story assumption, and uses scenes, a “world” type concept to repre-
sent the succession of temporal states, fictional entities appearing in
conversations and so on. On the other hand, Xapagy is differentiated
by its exclusive reliance on the raw autobiographical memory and its
fragmentation of real world entities (including the self) into loosely
interconnected instances. Accordingly, the reasoning approach, based
on shadows and headless shadows, concentrates on aligning the
relevant experiences from the autobiography with the current state of
the agent and projecting it into predictions about the future and the
inference of hidden or unspecified actions or relations in the present.
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